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Cognitive Effort and Memory
Sherman W. Tyler, Paula T. Hertel, Marvin C. McCallum, and
Henry C. Ellis
University of New Mexico
We propose that the concept of cognitive effort in memory is both useful and
important. Cognitive effort is defined as the engaged proportion of limited
capacity central processing. It·was hypothesized that this variable might have
important memorial consequences and might also be a potential confounding
factor .in levels-of-processing paradigms. The first experiment tested this
possibility using two types of incidental-learning tasks factorially combined
with two degrees of effort. It was found that high effort led to better recall
than low effort, but that level-of-processing effects were nonsignificant. A
second experiment clearly demonstrated the feasibility of using performance
on a secondary task as an independent criterion for measuring effort, and two
further experiments ruled out alternative accounts of effort effects. A reliable
levels-of-processing effect was obtained in the fourth experiment in which the
incidental-learning tasks were blocked. Implications and possible future ap
plications of the cognitive effort concept are discussed.

The concept of cognitive effort can be
best appreciated by examining it within
the context of levels-of-processing research.
The levels-of-processing approach has been
an especially popular one in recent years,
both as an impetus to research and as an
explanatory device for many general find
ings in memory (cf. Craik & Lockhart,
1972). The original notion was based on
the premise that a series of analyzers,
varying along a continuum from structural
to semantic analysis, is employed in pro
cessing an i tern for storage in memory; and
the greater the depth to which an item is
processed, the greater the probability it
will later be recalled. Repeated processing
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of a word to a given depth was assumed
not to improve memory beyond the level
associated with that depth.
This general view has been under con
sideraple attack lately. For example, Nelson
(1977) has argued that there are two major
problems with this viewpoint. First, it can
be demonstrated empirically that repeated
processing of an item to the same depth
does in fact improve memory relative to
nonrepeated processing. Second, the notion
of depth of processing is theoretically vapid,
since there is no independent measure by
which to order different processing tasks
along the depth continuum; the best that
can be done is divide the available tasks
into two or three nominal categories using
rather loose criteria. Baddeley (1978) has
made similar arguments, adding the point
that constructs later incorporated into this
approach, including notions such as com
patibility and breadth of processing, suffer
from the same lack of any independent
measurement criteria. Additional doubts
about depth have been recently noted by
Nelson, Walling, and McEvoy (1979) .
Given this state of affairs, we asked if
there could be an identifiable factor in
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memory processing, the effects of which
are directly reflected in recall performance,
and which can be described as a con
tinuum accessible to independent measure
ment. We propose that a reasonable can
didate is mental or cognitive effort, or
more explicitly, the amount of the available
processing capacity of the limited-capacity
central processor utilized in performing an
information-processing task. The proce
dures for measuring effort by evaluating
the attention-demand characteristics of
stimuli under various task conditions were
initially described by Ellis and Kreezer
(Note 1). Their approach used a method
ology based on divided attention, in which
the subject performed a primary motor
tracking task and a secondary task in
volving simple reaction time to auditory
or visual stimuli. The effort concept, more
formally introduced by Moray (1967),
seems particularly suitable in a number
of ways. Not only has it found considerable
utility in work such as that of Johnston
and Uhl (1976), Johnston, Wagstaff, and
Griffith (1972), Posner and Snyder (1975),
Keele (1973) , and Kahneman (1973), but
it also is susceptible to independent mea
surement through the use of a secondary
task, a procedure well reviewed by Kerr
(1973). Furthermore, it appears logical to
assume that the extent of involvement of
an individual in a cognitive task would
have a substantial impact on later memorial
performance.
The concept of cognitive effort was
proposed by Ellis (Note 2) as a mechanism
for accounting for perceptual grouping ef
fect in recall. In several studies (e.g., Ellis,
Parente, Grah, & Spiering, 1975; Ellis,
Parente, & Walker, 1974), letter strings
that were variably grouped on successive
presentations were recalled substantially
better than letter strings presented in con
stant fashion. This finding, known as the
variability effect in recall, is thought to
be the result of varied input leading to
greater effort in processing the letter
strings than constant input. In general,
recall is substantially greater when sub
jects reorganize the information rather
than process it as presented by the ex-

perimenter. Similar findings have been
reported more recently by Slamecka
and Graf (1978) and by Jacoby (1978).
Neither, however, provides evidence in
support of an effort hypothesis. More
specifically, Ellis (Note 2) proposed that
the amount of effort in processing a given
class of information can vary independently
of the level at which it is processed. Thus,
it is possible to process superficial struc
tural (perceptual) information as well as
semantic information with varying degrees
of effort. Accordingly, the degree of cog
nitive effort is viewed as an alternative
hypothesis in accounting for several mem
ory phenomena.
The possibility that effort, as a factor
separable from level of processing, can
produce recall differences has not been
totally ignored. Walsh and Jenkins (1973)
did report a series of experiments designed
to dismiss this possibility. Arguing that
no independent definition of effort existed,
they attempted to manipulate effort by
requiring subjects to perform either one
or two different incidental tasks on each
stimulus item, the latter presumably re
quiring greater effort. Finding, in the two
task case, that the amount recalled was
greater for the task requiring a deeper level
of processing and otherwise did not differ
from the one-task case, they rejected effort
as an influential factor. The major problem
with this study is the confusion of total
time with momentary effort. Performing
two tasks does not necessarily require a
larger amount of central-processing ca
pacity at a given point in time, especially if
subjects adopt the strategy of executing
the task serially, and hence effort may not
have been effectively manipulated. A simi
lar criticism applies to Craik and Tulving
(1975, Experiment 5). It is apparent, then,
that effort cannot be so lightly disregarded.
It is the purpose of this research to
provide a more valid test of effort as a
causal factor in word recall. To this end,
four experiments were run. The first was
designed to determine if experimenter
defined manipulations of effort within
single cognitive tasks would indeed affect
recall. The second attempted to establish
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an independent measurement criterion for
the effort continuum. The third and fourth
experiments were designed to rule out
possible alternative explanations of effort
effects; in addition, the fourth employed
a modification of the earlier designs,
changed to remove certain anomalies ob
served in previous results.
Experiment 1
In this experiment, the standard levels
of-processing paradigm was employed. Sub
jects experienced a series of nonsemantic
(anagram) and semantic (sentence-com
pletion) tasks, after which they were sur
prised with a word-recall test. For each
type of task, there were two different
degrees of effort, the difference correspond
ing to a manipulation believed on logical
grounds to correlate with momentary
central-processing capacity demands. For
the anagram task, subjects attempted to
unscramble a series of letters to determine
which of two words contained the same
letters. In the low-effort condition, the
anagrams were scrambled very little; in
the high-effort condition, letter rearrange
ment was extensive.
For the sentence-completion task, sub
jects tried to choose which of two presented
words fit into a blank in a given sentence.
For low-effort sentences a single word was
strongly implied, whereas for high-effort
sentences the best-fitting word was not
readily apparent.
The major hypothesis of this study was
that words encountered during high-effort
tasks would be better 'recalled than those
in the low-effort condition. This was an
obvious derivation for target words (correct
choices) , and was also extended to dis
tractor words on the assumption that,
being . simultaneously presented with the
target words, they could share in the pro
cessing effort required by the task.
Method
Materials. Eighty nouns of 5-8 letters were
selected from Paivio, Yuille, and Madigan's (1968)
norms and were of uniformly high imagery, meaning
fulness, and frequency values. For each word, four

task slides containing two anagrams and two sen
tences were constructed. The anagrams differed in
terms of the number of letter positions altered from
those in the source word; this manipulation produced
low-effort and high-effort anagrams. For example,
the word doctor was transformed into the anagrams
dortoc (low effort) and croodt (high effort). For the
sentence slides, sentences were constructed con
taining a blank into which the word could meaning
fully be inserted. The blanks occurred in the same
position in each sentence, generally at the end,
and served the same syntactic role in the two
sentences. The sentences differed only in the degree
to which each implied the missing word. Thus,
for low-effort sentences the missing word was
judged by the experimenters to be almost redundant
with other information in the sentence: The girl
was awakened by her frightening
For high
effort sentences the missing word was judged to be
less determined by the information in the sentence:
The man was alarmed by the frightening
· For
the above examples, the missing word was dream;
it has a relatively high probability of being chosen
for the low-effort sentence and is one of several
possibilities for the high-effort sentence. For this
task an attempt was also made to equalize the
imagery value and salience of the two sentences.
Target slides were composed of the target word
and a distractor, one appearing above the other,
with relative position being counterbalanced so
that target words occurred in the top position for
half of the slides. Distractors were chosen to mini
mize choice errors in the sentence completion task.
In general, completing the sentence with the dis
tractor yielded a completely meaningless statement.
Subjects and design. Sixteen students from in
troductory psychology classes were assigned separate
lists. Each list was composed of 40 target-distractor
pairs. Ten pairs were presented within each task
condition (low-effort anagram, high-effort anagram,
low-effort sentence, high-effort sentence). Further
more, target-distractor positions on the target slide
were counterbalanced within condition, and list
order was completely randomized. Therefore, each
subject saw all 80 words in a unique order. Across
subjects, each word was presented twice as a target
(once above the distractor and once below) and
twice as a distractor in each task condition.
Procedure. Subjects were run individually in an
incidental-learning paradigm. They were seated
before a rear projection screen, with two vertically
arranged buttons situated on the table in front
of them. The buttons were labeled top and bottom,
and there was a resting place for the finger indicated
between them. Subjects were told at the start of
the session that they would see a series of slide
pairs, each pair appearing simultaneously on the
screen. When an anagram appeared on the task
slide, the subjects' task was to determine to which
of two words on the target slide the anagram cor
responded, and to indicate their choice by pressing
the corresponding button, top or bottom, with
their preferred hand. When an incomplete sentence
appeared on the task slide, the task was to choose
--·

--
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processing, words in the sentence-comple
tion task being recalled only slightly better
than words in the anagram task.
Target recall. Figure 1 presents the
mean percent recall of target (correct)
words in each of the four task conditions.
A second analysis of variance for the
effects of effort and level of processing was
carried out for target words alone. Neither
the main effects of effort nor levels of
processing for target words were reliable,
nor was there any Effort X Level of Pro
cessing interaction. A separate analysis of
effort effects within each level of processing
revealed that high-effort sentence tasks led
to better recall than low-effort sentence
task, F(1, 15)
4.91, MS.
2.86, al
though there was no significant effect of
effort for the anagram task.
Distractor recall. An analysis of recall
for distractor words showed a pattern of
results similar to recall of target words.
For distractor (nontarget) words, the mean
percent recall for low- and high-effort
anagrams was 5.6% and 11.3%, respec
tively, and 7.5% and 19.4% for low- and
high-effort sentences, respectively. The
overall effect of effort on distractor recall
was significant, F(1, 15)
10.65, MS.
4.60, whereas there was neither a reli
able effect of levels of processing nor a
significant interaction of these two factors.
Finally, within the sentence-completion
task, effort had a reliable influence, F(l, 15)
6.45, MS.
3.49; within the anagram
task, the effort effect was not reliable.
=

Figure 1. Mean percent recall of words chosen as

correct responses in high- and low-effort anagrams
and sentence tasks.
the word that made most sense in the sentence.
Target slides were presented on the left side of the
screen, and task slides on the right, both shown
simultaneously. Subjects were informed that this
was a reaction-time experiment, although they were
to be sure of their choice before responding. Each
trial was preceded by a warning light, and five
practice trials were given. Finally, a constant
interval of 9 sec was observed from the onset of
one slide pair to the onset of the next.
Following the processing tasks, subjects engaged
in 30 sec of simple arithmetic and were then asked
to free recall all words appearing on the target
slides. Guessing was encouraged by the instructions,
and all subjects were required to guess at the end
of their initial recall periods.

=

=

=

Results and Discussion
Overall recall. We first examined the
mean percent word recall using an analysis
of variance with three within-subject fac
tors : word type (target vs. distractor) ,
degree of effort, and level of processing.
In this and all future analyses, values of
p < .OS were considered significant. More
words were recalled in the high-effort
(18.6%) than in the low-effort condition
(11.1 %), F(1, 15)
8.50, MS.
16.93.
A secondary finding was that recall of
correctly chosen words was greater than
18.64,
recall of distractor words, F(1, 15)
MS.
8.38; however, this factor did not
interact with either of the other two factors.
Finally, there was no effect of level of
=

=

=

=

=

=

Experiment 2
Experiment 1 provided substantial sup
port for the role of cognitive effort in
recall. The major purpose of the second
experiment was to establish an independent
measure to assess the effort required for
a given task, and to use the measure to
validate the effort manipulation employed
in the first experiment. In addition, a slight
modification of the original task was made
in order to magnify the impact of the
effort manipulation. It was felt that since
the effort manipulation was confined to
the relation between the target word and

COGNITIVE EFFORT AND MEMORY

the task, including a distractor with the
target might have modified the effort
actually required for a given task. There
fore, a change was made from the two
choice reaction-time task to a simple
yes-no decision task.
The logic of this experiment essentially
follows that presented by Kerr (1973) in
her review of secondary task paradigms,
and the specific design used is quite similar
to that of Ellis and Kreezer (Note 1) and
Johnston and Uhl (1976) . The basic idea
involves adding a secondary tone-detection
task to the primary task, the assumption
being that the greater the proportion of
the limited-capacity central processor re
quired for the primary task, the worse the
performance will be on the secondary task.
The primary task, as emphasized by in
structions, was the same for this experi
ment as the task used in Experiment 1,
with the exception that instead of choosing
between two words, subjects simply de
termined whether a single word was correct
(i.e., fit in the sentence or could be made
from the scrambled letters) . At the same
time subjects performed the prim�,:�,ry task,
they were required to press anoth�r button
as quickly as possible whenever tfiey heard
a tone over their headphones, and reaction
times for tone detection were recorded.
Two major predictions were derived from
effort theory. First, it was expected that
correct words would in general be more
frequently recalled if they appeared in the
high-effort tasks than if they were present
in low-effort tasks. No predictions were
made regarding words for which a negative
response was appropriate, since the effort
manipulation bore no obvious relationship
to the incorrect words. Second, measures
of tone-detection reaction times were ex
pected to reflect directly the effort needed
for a given type of task, with high-effort
tasks showing longer reaction times than
low-effort tasks.
Method
Materials, subjects, and design. Task slides were
identical to those in Experiment 1; however, target
slides contained only one word that was either
the correct word for the task or the incorrect

_J
_J
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Figure Z. Mean percent recall of words for which
positive responses were approp.riate, separated ac
cording to level of processing and effort condition.

distractor previously paired with the word in
Experiment 1. Sixteen subjects from introductory
psychology classes received the same lists of tasks
as did those in Experiment 1. The new correspond
ing targets were counterbalanced within task condi
tion so that half would yield yes responses and half
would yield no responses. Thus, each subject saw
40 words, and across subjects each word was
presented once for a positive response and once for
a negative response in each task condition.
Procedure. Subjects were run individually in an
incidental learning paradigm that included a dis
junctive reaction-time primary task and a tone
detection secondary task (probe task). They were
seated at a table in front of a rear projection
screen. On one side of the table were two buttons
labeled yes and no, and on the other was a button
labeled tone. These could be shifted according to
the subjects' handedness. The two tasks were then
described to the subjects. For the primary task,
the subjects determined whether the target word
on the left side of the screen could be used to
complete the task on the right side of the screen,
that is, whether it could be constructed from
scrambled l etters for anagram task slides or fitted
in a sentence blank for sentence-completion task
slides. For the secondary task, they were told that
on some trials a tone would occur over the left
earphone. Upon its occurrence, they were to press
the tone button with their nonpreferred hand and
continue with the primary task. It was emphasized
that the primary task was the one of most im
portance. Probe onset occurred either 500, 1,000,
1,500, or 2,000 msec following the onset of the
slide pair, or not at all. The probe was a weak
1000-Hz tone of approximately 14 dB (SPL). The
five probe conditions were counterbalanced within
task conditions and response (yes, no) conditions.
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Table 1

Mean Probe Reaction Times (in msec)
for Positive and Negative Responses
Primary task response
Primary task
condition

Positive

Negative

1,155
1,205
937
1,225

1,047
1, 140
1,204
1, 137

Low-effort anagram
High-effort anagram
Low-effort sentence
High-effort sentence

In all other respects, the procedure was identical
to that of Experiment 1.

Percent recall. Figure 2 presents mean
percent recall of words for which positive
responses were appropriate, presented ac
cording to the type of processing task. As
in the first experiment, an analysis of
variance for these words showed that the
overall effect of effort was significant,
F(l, 15)
6.82, MS.
3.67, and that
there was no reliable levels-of-processing
�ffect a�d no Effort X Level of Processing
mteractwn. Further analysis of the effect
of effort within each level of processing
established a substantial effect within sen
tence-completion tasks, F(l, 15)
10.90,
MS.
1.46, but no reliable effect within
anagram tasks.
Percent recall for negative responses was
much lower than for positive responses
(10.0% and 7.5% for low- and high-effort
anagrams, and 23.8% and 27.5% for low
and high-effort sentences). As revealed by
an analysis of variance, effort was not a
reliable factor in accounting for negative
response recall, although there was an
effect of level of processing for negative
responses, F(1, 15)
15.73, MS.
2.89.
Probe reaction time. Table 1 reports
mean probe response latencies for both
positive and negative responses in the
primary processing task. The means repre
sent response times for all four probe onset
latencies and exclude response times to
probes occurring after the response to the
primary task was executed. (A preliminary
analysis determined that there were no
=

=

=

=

=

=

Results and Discussion

=

differential effects due to time of probe
onset.) The most important finding was
that effort differences in reaction time cor
responded to effort differences in percent
recall. An analysis of variance applied to
probe latencies for positive primary-task
responses established that such responses
were longer during the high-effort pro
cessing tasks, F(l, 15)
5.41, MS.
.40.
Differences in probe reaction time across
levels of processing were not reliable, nor
wa� the E� o�t X Level of Processing inter
actiOn. W1thm tasks, probe latencies were
longer for the high-effort sentence-comple
tion task than for the low-effort sentence
task, F(1, 15)
15.00, MS.
.09, but
t� ere was no such effect for anagrams.
Fmally, no reliable effects of either effort
or level of processing were obtained for
negative responses in the processing task.
Several points deserve emphasis. First,
the use of a secondary task to provide an
independent measure of effort was shown
to be successful. The pattern of significant
effort effects for both positive and negative
responses in recall performance was mir
rored exactly in the probe reaction-time
data, even extending to effects within each
task. AI�o, it is noteworthy that in spite
_
level-of-processing effect for
of a s1gmficant
the recall of negative response words, there
was no such effect for probe reaction
time�. T� is clearly indicates that probe
react10n-t1me performance does measure
something separate from and independent
of depth of processing.
The second point to be made is that
the manipula�ions used to vary effort,
based on a log1cal rather than an empirical
approach, were generally successful and
were enhanced by using a simple reaction
time task instead of a two-choice task.
Apparently, the required central-processing
capacity was indeed being manipulated.
The last point relates to the lack of a
significant level-of-processing effect in the
first experiment. It is possible that as
suming the overriding importance of effort
this outcome might have been due to a�
absence of any difference in effort between
these particular nonsemantic and semantic
tasks. This speculation is supported by the

=

=

=
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reaction-time data of this second study,
which essentially show no overall difference
between the two levels of processing. An
alternative explanation will be considered
in the fourth experiment.
Experiment 3
There is an alternative account of the
findings of the preceding experiments de
monstrating effort effects, namely, that
the determining factor is not the difference
due to variations in momentary effort,
rather it is the total time required for
each task that affects recall. High-effort
tasks may simply take longer to perform
than low-effort tasks, and this alone may
lead to better recall. Unfortunately, more
is needed to assess this possibility than
simply looking at reaction times for the
primary task. This is so because total
reaction time includes the time required
to read the task slide, and the latter un
doubtedly differs for the different task
conditions. Thus, it almost certainly takes
longer for the average subject to read a
sentence than to read a near word (i.e.,
anagram); similarly, an anagram in the
high-effort condition, being less like a real
word, may well take longer to read than
one in the low-effort condition. The de
pendent variable needed to rule out the
total time explanation is one that corrects
total reaction times for differences in
reading times. The purpose of this experi
ment was to obtain an estimate of this
dependent variable by separately assessing
the total reaction time and the task
reading time for the same subject on each
task, and then analyzing the differences
between task conditions using the resultant
adjusted dependent variable.
Method
Materials, subjects, and design. Sixteen s';lbiects
.
from introductory psychology courses partiCipated,
each being assigned a different list of task and
target items. Specific tasks and targets, as well �s
specific orders, were identical to those used m
Experiment 2.
Procedure. The experiment consisted of two
phases the first to assess task reaction times and
the se�ond to evaluate task reading times. The
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two phases were conducted 2 days apart in order
to minimize possible transfer effects, and subjects
were run individually. The first phase consisted of
a series of yes-no decision tasks identical to those
used in the incidental learning phase of Experi
ment 2. The instructions and general setup of
equipment were also identical. Following the first
phase, each subject was instructed to return 2 days
later for another session and was then dismissed.
In the second phase, the subjects were told that
they would now see the same task slides as had
been seen in the first session, but without any
associated target slides. The task was simply to
read each task slide, then press the top button
used for yes responses as soon as the reading of
the slide was completed. Each subject was then
shown the 40 task slides, and reading times were
recorded.

Results and Discussion

A new dependent variable, decision time,
was computed by subtracting the reading
time for each task from the corresponding
reaction time to perform that task with
a given target item. This was done sepa
rately for each subject, thereby producing
a new set of 40 decision times for each.
Decision time thus reflected the time needed
to determine the appropriate response for
a given task-target pairing, with the time
required for reading the task removed.
The mean decision times for correct yes
decisions were as follows: for low-effort
anagrams, 2,018 msec; for low-effort sen
tences, 1,287 msec; for high-effort ana
grams, 1,758 msec; and for high-effort
sentences, 1,563 msec. An analysis of vari
ance verified that the effect of effort was
nonsignificant, although there was a level
of-processing effect, anagram tasks re
quiring longer to perform than sentence
completion tasks, F(1, 15)
14.17. MS.
.96. There was no interaction of these
two factors. Though uninformative, a simi
lar analysis of correct no decisions showed
an absence of any reliable effects of level
of processing or of effort.
It appears, then, that effort effects
cannot be readily accounted for by an
appeal to the total time hypothesis. When
reaction times are corrected for reading
time variations, there is virtually no dif
ference between low-effort and high-effort
tasks.
=

=
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Experiment 4
There were two main reasons for con
ducting the final experiment. The first was
to demonstrate further the inadequacy of
the total-time explanation of the obtained
effort effects, and the second was to re
move two anomalies encountered in pre
vious experiments.
The first goal was achieved by changing
the nature of the task from one in which
both target and task slide were presented
simultaneously and remained present
throughout task execution, to one in which
the target slide was presented only briefly
and appeared prior to the task slide. By
making this change, any possibility that
effort effects were arising due to greater
time spent by subjects on the physically
present target slide during high-effort tasks
could be eliminated.
To explain how the second goal was
achieved, the two anomalies observed in
the earlier experiments need to be specified.
One anomaly centers on the consistent
failure to obtain a reliable effort effect for
the anagram task alone, despite the fact
that this was obtained for the sentence
completion task in both of the first two
experiments and despite the presence in
the second experiment of an overall effect
of effort. A second anomaly concerns the
failure in each of the preceding studies to
obtain a reliable level-of-processing effect
for correct positive responses.
The first anomaly may have been due
to the fact that the target item was
physically present throughout the task.
Thus, in the anagram task, subjects may
simply have scanned back and forth be
tween target and task slides directly com
paring letters, and the effect of differences
in degree of letter rearrangement may
thereby have been much reduced. It was
hoped, therefore, that the previously men
tioned change in tris experiment from
simultaneous to succ'essive presentation of
target-task slide pairs would result in the
attainment of an effort effect for anagrams.
The second anomaly, lack of level-of
processing effects, may have been due to
the intermixing of anagram and sentence
completion tasks. Given that the nature

of the task was never known in advance
and that subjects were instructed to read
the target slide first, all words may have
been processed to a fairly deep level,
whether appearing in an anagram or a
sentence-completion task. To reduce this
difficulty, the paradigm was further modi
fied. Sentence-completion and anagram
tasks were blocked 5o that a number of
tasks of the same type occurred for a series
of trials, and subjects were informed in
advance of the type of task that would
occur within each given block. It was
anticipated that as a result of these
changes, subjects would be more inclined
to process the target item only to the
depth required by the task.
Method
Materials, subjects, and design.

Subjects were

32 volunteers from introductory psychology courses.

The specific target and task slides used were essen
tially the same as those employed in Experiment 2.
However, slides were arranged for a given subject
so that there was a series of sentence-completion
tasks followed by a series of anagram tasks, and
vice-versa, composing a total of four blocks. In
addition, five trials at the beginning of the experi
ment were treated as practice trials, as was the
first trial of each new block, and target items
that were recalled later from these trials were not
scored. Furthermore, a color slide was used to
signal the nature of the task to be performed
within the upcoming block of trials: A blue slide
meant the tasks would all involve anagrams, a red
slide signaled the sentence-completion task, and
a yellow slide at the end of the entire series of
slides meant that the primary task was no longer
in effect and only probe detection would be neces
sary for the remainder of the trials.
For half of the subjects, the first and t)lird
blocks consisted of anagram tasks, the second and
fourth of sentence-completion tasks; for the other
half, this order was reversed. Across subjects, each
word appeared in each block in each task condi
tion, and in each of these conditions the response
of yes was appropriate for half of the subjects
and the response of no for the other half. Each
subject, therefore, experienced a unique ordering
of task and target slides. There was a total of
40 slide pairs, excluding practice slides, shown to
each subject. Thus a typical series of slides might
be blue slide, 15 anagram tasks (including five
practice trials); red slide, 11 sentence-completion
tasks (including one practice trial); blue slide,
11 anagram tasks; red slide, 11 sentence-completion
tasks; yellow slide.
Procedure. The equipment setup was the same
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as in Experiment 2, as were the primary and
secondary tasks. Subjects were informed of the
nature of the primary task and were further in
structed that a given type of task would occur for
a number of trials, the nature of that task being
signaled by a preceding color slide. Which color
signaled which task was fully explained until sub
jects said they clearly understood the relationship.
Subjects were then told about the tone-detection
task and were instructed to press the appropriate
button whenever a tone was heard over the head
phones. It was stressed that they should do this
as quickly as possible, although it was most im
portant that they do well on the primary task.
Subjects were then shown all target-task slide
pairs. The tone, as in Experiment 2, occurred
either 500, 1,000, 1,500, or 2,000 msec after task
slide onset, or not at all; for each type of task,
there was an equal number of probes at each onset
time. Following the appearance of the yellow slide
at the end of the entire series of slide pairs, five
trials of tone detection alone were administered
in order to reduce recency effects in recall. Finally,
subjects were asked to recall as many of the words
seen during the primary task as they could re
member. Guessing was encouraged, and subjects
were required to produce at least 20 words.

615

Table 2

Mean Probe Reaction Times (in msec) for
Positive and Negative Responses
Primary task response

Primary task
condition
Low-effort anagram
High-effort anagram
Low-effort sentence
High-effort sentence

Positive

Negative

745
953
791
1,127

747
749
831
856

cessing, F(1, 31)
5.24, MS.
3. 73, with
no interaction of these two factors. A fur
ther analysis of effort effects within each
level of processing established reliable
effects for both sentences, F (1, 31)
9.62,
MS.
1.87, and anagrams, F(1, 31)
9.89, MS.
1.39.
Words for which negative responses were
appropriate only showed a significant level
of processing effect, F(1, 31)
11.33, MS.
3.38. There was no effort effect and no
reliable interaction for these words.
Probe reaction time. All probes that
appeared after the subject responded to
the primary task were eliminated from the
analysis. As in Experiment 2, there was no
effect of time of probe onset, so all probe
reaction times were combined within each
task condition. Separate analyses of vari
ance were performed for positive and
negative responses. Table 2 presents the
mean probe response latencies for both
positive and negative responses, divided
according to primary task condition. For
positive responses, probe latencies were
longer in the high-effort than in the low
19.79,
effort primary tasks, F(1, 31)
MS.
.48. There were no differences in
probe latencies for different levels of pro
cessing, nor was there any interaction.
Within each level of processing, effort had
a reliable influence: for anagrams, F(l, 31)
18.83, MS.
.07; for sentences, F(l, 31)
11.34, MS.
.32. For negative re
sponses there were no reliable effects of
effort or level of processing, nor was there
an interaction of these factors.
Thus, the adjustments made in this ex
periment did eliminate the anomalies ob
served in the earlier studies. Word recall
=

=

=

=

=

=

=

=

Results and Discussion
Percent recall. Figure 3 shows the mean
percent recall of words for which positive
responses were appropriate, divided ac
cording to specific task condition. For these
words, an analysis of variance revealed
main effects of both effort, F(1, 31)
28.97, MS.
2.18, and level of pro=

=

=

=

=

=

Figure 3. Mean percent recall of words for which
positive responses were appropriate, separated by
level of processing and effort condition.

=

=

616

TYLER, HERTEL, McCALLUM, AND ELLIS

for items appearing in positive response
tasks was not only higher for high-effort
tasks generally, but was also reliably higher
for high-effort anagrams than for low
effort anagrams and for high-effort sen
tences over low-eftort sentences when these
effects were looked at separately. A sub
stantial level-of-processing effect was also
obtained for positive as well as negative
response items in this experiment.
Furthermore, the adequacy of probe
response times as an index of cognitive
effort once more received substantial jus
tification. Not only were probe response
latencies for positive response items longer
in the high-effort conditions taken as a
whole, but as in word recall, they were
also longer for high-effort anagrams and
for high-effort sentences when separately
compared to their low-effort counterparts.
Also, there were no probe reaction-time
differences between anagram and sentence
completion tasks for either negative or
positive responses, despite the fact that
there were level of processing effects evi
dent in word recall for both types of
response. This once again points to the
independence of cognitive effort from the
depth of processing notion.
General Discussion
The major conclusions from this re
search are threefold: (a) Effort can be
orthogonally varied within different levels
of processing; (b) the amount of effort
. required by a task is an important de
terminant of later recall performance, with
greater effort leading to greater recall;
(c) there is available an independent, sen
sitive measurement criterion of effort,
namely, secondary task performance, and
this metric measures something separate
from the level of processing involved. The
viability of the cognitive effort concept as
an explanatory factor in memory research,
as well as its relative advantage over the
levels-of-processing view, given its suscep
tibility to precise quantitative specifica
tion, has thus been supported.
Several questions warranting further in
vestigation are suggested by these conclu-

sions, only two of which are mentioned.
One concerns determination of which
manipulations of task requirements and
specific stimulus attributes correspond to
manipulations of effort. This determina
tion can, of course, be simply made through
a strict empirical approach, that is, by
evaluating the effects of various manipula
tions on secondary task performance, as
suming a secondary task of sufficient sen
sitivity. A taxonomy of those stimulus and
task dimensions closely tied to the effort
continuum would potentially be of con
siderable theoretical interest, since such
dimensions would presumably correspond
to the factors of importance in predicting
memorial performance.
A second question pertains to the mecha
nism whereby differences in effort lead to
differences in recalL It could be that with
greater effort, there is a greater tendency
to integrate the context (or task environ
ment) and the target word, thereby fa
cilitating later retrieval, or it might be the
case that an item in a higher effort situation
is stored in memory as a trace of greater
strength. A number of techniques could be
used to assess these various possibilities.
These might include the use of memory
paradigms other than free recall to de
termine the relative importance of re
trieval operations and the addition of an
intentionality dimension, that is, varying
whether subjects are informed of the final
memory test, to evaluate the extent to
which effort is under voluntary control.
Certainly, the experiments reported here
raise numerous questions deserving further
investigative consideration. It is hoped
that the cognitive effort concept will pro
vide a framework for such investigations
that lacks some of the shortcomings evi
dent in the depth-of-processing approach.
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